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FAILURE AS AUTHORITY
Poetic Voices
and the Muse of Grace in
William Cowper's The Task
David Paxman

voices in William Cowper's The Task (1785) are
1^1^ legion. A partial list includes self-therapist, mock hero,
wounded deer, denouncer and scold, satirist, ironist,
moral diagnostician and historian, critic, pleaser, prophet,
panegyrist, animal rights advocate, blesser, curser, life's refugee,
meditator, protector, preacher, naturalist, garden instructor, and
dreamer. Lx)ng, rambling poems, especially when they combine
reflection and exhortation, are bound to use many voices, but
The Task particularly invites questions about how the contexts
in which Cowper saw himself as acting influenced the
modulations in which he speaks, how the sequence of voices
affects readings of the poem, and, finally, whether Cowper's
personae can be heard as probable elements of a single poetic
ethos. ^
' For convenience' sake I will simply refer to the speakers in the poem as Cowper and not
attempt to differentiate them sharply from the historical person. While I see the distinction
as generally important, I will argue that Cowper wants his voices to be heard as belonging
to his living, biographical self. In any case, I believe that my discussion will stand whether
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Some aspects of these problems are specific to Cowper and his
text, some to prophetic-satiric discourse generally, and some to
cultural conditions in late eighteenth-century England. This essay sets
out to demonstrate that the contexts and traditions in which Cowper
saw himself as acting provided him not only with compelling
precedents for speaking in several tongues, but with strategies for
resolving apparent differences among them. The essay will first
address the problem of fragmentation and contradiction by
contrasting two dominant voices that subsume many, though not all,
of those heard in the poem: the hard voice of the biblical prophet and
the soft voice of the self-conscious, suffering, fellow human. It will
then describe three contexts or traditions that conditioned Cowper's
modulations. These are post-Augustan poetry, evangelical religion,
and ethical philosophy. Drawing on these traditions, Cowper
modulates and qualifies his stern voice so that it is heard as a
manifestation of sympathy and fellowship. Ultimately, however, he
doesn't aim for complete success in harmonizing the voices. A
certain kind of failure serves his purposes more readily than would
the more aesthetically pleasing artifices of synthesis and integration.
From within that fragmentation, Cowper employs a rhetoric of grace,
deferring the voice impasse to a higher being who can hold
accountable both poet and audience and who can make efficacious the
finite, inconsistent, and potentially foolish utterances of a divided
man.
In his first major publication. Poems (1782), Cowper adopted
authoritative poses on topics such as "Truth," "The Progress of
Error," and "Expostulation." The Task opens in virtual retreat from
such topics and poses:
I sing the Sofa. I who lately sang
Truth, Hope, and Charity, and touch'd with awe
The solemn chords, and with a trembling hand,
Escap'd with pain from the advent'rous flight.
Now seek repose upon an humbler theme. (I, 1-5)^

the voices we hear in these other sources are considered to be those of the historical Cowper
or other coordinate, textually constructed representations.
^ Citations to The Task are from Cowper: Poetical Works^ ed. H. S. Milford, 4th ed. rev.
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
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The short history of furniture that follows this passage narrates a
parallel retreat of historical proportions. It tells not only how chairs
have developed, but how the imposing figures who sat in them to
wield salutary power over their societies have changed. The "hardy
chief upon the rugged rock" and King Alfred, who "sway'd the
sceptre of his infant realm" on a joint stool (I, 12, 23) have given way
to effete ladies and gouty gentlemen dozing on plush sofas. This is a
symptomatic history, showing a long moral decline through images
of bodily vigor and disease and their corresponding furnishings. His
images for the later stages appropriately include the sofa that "suits
the gouty limb" (I, 106-07), the nurse who "sleeps sweetly, hir'd to
watch the sick. Whom snoring she disturbs" (I, 89-90), and Cowper,
pleading that he may live "exempted...from pangs arthritic, that infest
the toe Of libertine excess" (I, 105-06).
Clearly, even though he seeks "repose upon a humbler theme," he
wants more than repose and even more than simple exemption from
his nation's malaise; he wants to diagnose and cure it. When he
moves out of doors to ruminate on wider themes, he thinks often of
the awesome and much-needed power of the pulpit and of the affected
preachers who now seem to fill it. "Nations, ignorant of God...no
longer taught By monitors that mother church supplies. Now make
our own," he states. Anticipating the question, "What was a monitor
in George's days," he explains that in addition to its usual sense, a
monitor means a thin plank strapped to the back of an aging or
deformed person to "secure A form, not now gymnastic as of yore.
From rickets and distortion, else our lot" (II, 574-92).
Cowper wants to fill the void, restore a past of salutary authority,
and secure his morally decrepit society from further dissolution. He
feels compelled to instruct his contemporaries on urban vanity and
rural virtue, unruly colleges and forgotten rigor, pulpit pretenders and
poets, and madness and tranquility. But the pain with which he
"escap'd the advent'rous flight" of his earlier poetry now suggests
paths besides direct expostulation.
Since pulpits fail, and sounding-boards reflect
Most part an empty ineffectual sound.
What chance that I, to fame so little known.
Nor conversant with men or matters much.
Should speak to purpose, or with better hope
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Crack the satiric thong? (Ill, 21-6)
This is more than a rhetorical question. If Cowper, the sofa, and the
therapeutic poetic text descend respectively from King Alfred, his
rough-hewn stool, sacred scripture, and just law, one may legitimately
ask how such a figure, platform, and medium accrue effective
authority in the diminished world they emblematize.
To achieve credibility in that world requires great dexterity. It
requires near-simultaneous assertion and equivocation, self-assuredness
and self-consciousness, and truth and its immediate qualification. The
voices adapted for such dextrous harmony (if harmony it is^ defy
rigorous, unifying schemes, but they cluster loosely around the two
modes already evident in the above passages: the prophet and the
quivering refugee from life. And these poses generally respond to
two complementary ways in which Cowper depicts the world. First,
he treats it as a lamentable degeneration of former greatness, a place
of silly fops and sofas where long-enduring standards of truth and
conduct have been forgotten and where the moral and intellectual
quacks who most influence society deserve, at the very least, satiric
exposure. This is largely a public world. The second is a private one
of moral struggle where social fads, intellectual fashions, church
politics, and national policy matter only as sources of temptation and
the resulting individual moral triumph or failure. In the first world,
Cowper stands ready to pronounce on general issues, to expose
through ridicule, and to point the way back to greatness. Like the
oak tree that "owes His firm stability to what he scorns" (1, 383-84),
he stands above his targets of attack: the gilded social butterfly, the
historian, the geologist, the pedant, the indulgent teacher, the scholar,
the adulteress, and the affected, sensual preacher. Over these "maniacs
dancing in their chains" (II, 663) he has absolute dominion. He
creates and manages them, pinning them in verbal portraits like so
many insects in a collection.
While exercising sway over these figures, however, Cowper seems
to hear them whisper of the risks of censure. Samuel Johnson had
observed in Rambler No. 155, "The officious monitor is persecuted
with hatred, not because his accusation is false, but because he
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assumes that superiority which we are not willing to grant him."'
Whether motivated by dread of such hatred or by self-doubt or by
some combination of the two, Cowper frequently disclaims
superiority. He pointedly disqualifies himself from the contest of
champions because he has, by his own admission, fled the world,
unable to resist its fashions or withstand its temptations:
Retreat
Cannot indeed to guilty man restore
Lost innocence, or cancel follies past;
But it has peace, and much secures the mind
From all assaults of evil.
and further:
To combat may be glorious, and success
Perhaps may crown us; but to fly is safe.
(Ill, 676-88)
When the fleeing mood has ahold of him, he speaks as the deer, too
wounded and frail to endure strife, that needs God's healing (III,
108-20). He roves the paths and groves, an emblem that "All are
wand'rers, gone astray Each in his own delusions" (III, 124-25). This
self-representation doesn't totally preclude his status as moral hero or
prophet, but it confines it to the borders of his second world image,
that of the world as a platform of private moral struggle, a place
where, in the individual human heart, the forces of good battle
quietly though heroically against evil. Here he announces his
credentials with less diffidence. This world has its prophets and
martyrs, though the "world o'erlooks [them] in her busy search."
Cowper invites readers to ask one of them
what trophies he has rais'd.
Or what achievements of immortal fame
He purposes, and he shall answer—None.
His warfare is within. There unfatigu'd
' The Rambler, ed. W. J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1969), 3:61.
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His fervent spirit labours. There he fights
And there obtains fresh triumphs o'er himself,
And never with'ring wreaths, compar'd with which
The laurels that a Caesar reaps are weeds.
(VI, 915, 932-39)
So if he can't take on the degenerate world, he can achieve a victory
far more brilliant in the quiet of his own quarters and in so doing
reclaim the authority he seemed to relinquish.
The problem is that, set side by side, the different voices, along
with their implicit authority claims, threaten to undo each other.
The angry man of God and the delicate refugee risk losing their
harmony as personae of the same poet. And the more vividly the
poet paints the dangers of delusion and exaggerates the numbers of
the deluded "millions," the harder it becomes to distinguish between
that urgent call and the madman's harangue. The more we hear the
voice of the wounded refugee wandering the countryside, the more
difficult it becomes to distinguish between that figure and Crazy Kate
(I, 534-56) or the various other figures of madness and distress,
between a Cowper righteously indignant at the adulteress and a
Cowper projecting rage at his own sexual and moral impotence, or
between the Cowper who seems to know the curvatures of the past
and the historian he chastises for pretending to know the thoughts of
obscure humans, To the extent that, for any particular reader,
Cowper's personae fragment into incoherence, like a battalion of
distempers haunting the village, garden, and wood paths, the poem
goes down as a noble failure.
However contingent or fictional the idea of a unified personality,
a certain degree of coherence is necessary in discourse, even more so
in public, poetic disputation, where inconsistencies in ethos can arm
adversaries for counter-attack. A passage from Swift's "An Argument
against Abolishing Christianity" will remind us of the need for
coherence and move us from the dynamics of the poem itself to the
contexts that shaped Cowper's selection of voices. The "Argument"
records this observation;
The Free-Thinkers consider it [the gospel] as a sort of Edifice
wherein all the parts have such a mutual Depetidance on each
other, that if you happen to pull out one single Nail, the whole
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Fabrick must fall to the Ground. This was happily expressed
by him, who had heard of a Text brought in for Proof of the
Trinity, which in an antient Manuscript was differently read;
he thereupon immediately took the Hint, and by a sudden
Deduction of a long Sorites, most logically concluded; Why, if
it be as you say, I may safely whore and drink on, and defy the
Parson."*
The fact that this character misconstrues the relationship between
authoritative texts and the parson's power to act as moral guide
shouldn't distract us from regarding the core issue as a legitimate one.
A system of moral (and, equally so, poetic) authority is a kind of
edifice built of truth and the right to disseminate and enforce it, and
if too many nails are pulled out, the "fabrick" will fall.
In the eighteenth century, nails were coming loose as new types
of poetic ethos replaced the rhetorically brilliant, socially engaged
genius of the Augustans, as individual inspiration challenged
communal revelation vested in church and tradition, and as
psychologically and socially derived ethics replaced that founded on
external command. These three contexts—the poetic, the religious,
and the philosophical—helped to determine Cowper's voices. Each
one provided Cowper with models of multi-voiced discourse and with
the means of resolving the threat of incoherence that such discourse
brings. I will begin with the poetic.
When Cowper changed The Task from short ruminations on an
avowedly trivial topic addressed to a small domestic audience into a
long discourse on personal, religious, and social ills addressed to a
national audience, he stepped into a long-standing tradition of poet as
prophet and civic censor. He also rushed into a vacuum of
authoritative poetic voice after the death of Pope. Poets that followed
Pope expressed a growing consensus over the need for new norms and
idioms as they tested new poetic modes, rewrote critical judgment, re
defined poetic genius, and "fled from history" (John Sitter's phrase for
their lack of engagement in the immediate political and social
* "An Argument against Abolishing Christianity in England," BickerstaffPapers and Pamphlets
on the Church, vol. 2 of The Prose Works of Jonathan Swift, ed. Herbert Davis (Oxford;
Blackwell, 1957), 38.
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problems of the day).^ Bertrand Bronson's classic study defines the
essence of mid and late eighteenth-century poetry as its "uncommittedness."^ Taken together, Johnson's heavy complexity, Gray's
quest for poetic legitimacy in Welsh bards, Macpherson's forgeries,
the graveyard poets' brooding "trips to the charnel-house in a
Chippendale chair,Collins' syntactically complex mourning of the
loss of the poetic gift. Smart's mad rhapsodies, Crabbe's demythologizing of rural bliss, and Goldsmith's easy, nostalgic couplets
lamenting the departure of poetry from Britain all register uncertainty
about the topics that poets may address and how they should sound
in doing so. To mention just one alternative more particularly—how
does one claim inspiration when the heavens no longer speak.'
Collins' "Ode on the Poetical Character" asks that question. It is an
important issue for Cowper, one with answers as mixed and
contradictory as the voices in The Task to which they relate, In
placing Cowper's voice strategies in context of the poetic tradition, I
will review his thoughts on his originality and usefulness as poet, his
anxieties about the genius of Pope, and his corribined desires and fears
about donning the mantle of the poet-prophet.
As Cowper found his idiom in The Task, he touted the originality
of his images and thoughts, and even his prosody, because they were
drawn from that great reservoir of poetic legitimacy in the late
eighteenth century, the self:
My descriptions are all from Nature. Not one of them secondhanded. My delineations of the heart are froin my own
experience: not one of them borrowed from books, or iii the
least degree, conjectural. In niy numbers...I have imitated
nobody, though sometiines perhaps there may be an apparent
resernblance, (LPW 2:285)'

^ John Sitter, "The Flight front History in Mid-Century Poetry," Literary Loneliness iri Midpighteenth-Century England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 77-103.
' "The Pre-Romantic or Post-Augustan Mode," ELH 20 (1953), 15-28,
' Bronson, 21.
* Letter to William Unwin, October 10, 1784, The Letters and Prose Writings cf William
Cowper, ed. James King and Charles Ryskamp, 5 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979-1986). Hereafter cited in the text as LPW.
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This vein promises assertive self-definition and a keen sense of
purpose, but it represents only one of his many, often more diffident,
attitudes toward his poetic work. His early belief that poetry could
achieve laudable purposes where sober discourse failed seemed actually
to decline. His "Poetical Epistle to Lady Austen" (written 1781,
before he had begun The Task) presents him as a scribbler who will
nonetheless
catch the triflers of the time.
And tell them truths divine and clear
Which, couch'd in prose, they will not hear.'
In "Hope," he glorifies the poet whose toil finds "thankful soil" and
"fruit." Happier still are they "who comfort those that wait To hear
plain truth at Judah's hallow'd gate."'°
If comforting the faithful is the happiest poetic task, some lesser
reward must come to those who simply denounce society with no
hope of changing its course. In a letter to William Unwin
accompanying a manuscript of The Task, Cowper explained,
I can write nothing without aiming at least at usefullness. It
were beneath my years to do it, and still more dishonorable to
my religion. I know that a reformation of such abuses as I
have censured, is not to be expected from the efforts of a poet;
but to contemplate the world, its follies, its vices, its indiffer
ence to duty, and its strenuous attachment to what is evil, and
not to reprehend, were further to approve it. (LPW 2:284)
Notice the paradox of "usefulness." The poem is not a true
corrective: the abuses it depicts can't be reformed by such impotent
measures. Yet the poem stands, if only as a record that the poet has
not strolled hand in hand with the evils crowding around him. Such
activity is "useful," in only a limited sense, to the poet and those who
already share his opinions.
Passages on poetry in The Task further represent the diffidence of
Cowper's poetic motives. He loves the "pleasure in poetic pains" that
' Poetical Works^ 335.
Poetical Worksy 76.
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bring relief from the "anxieties of life." But this relief pertains to the
writer more than reader:
Such joys he has that sings. But ah! not such,
Or seldom such, the hearers of his song.
Perhaps Cowper is only being politely self-deprecating here, but I
don't think so. Cowper loved the "pleasure in poetic pains Which
only poets know" (II, 285-86). Such pains were part of the laborious
search for language that will
arrest the fleeting images that fill
The mirror of the mind, and hold them fast.
And force them sit still till he has pencil'd off
A faithful likeness of the forms he views.
(II, 290-3)
This is, as he calls it, a labor of "art" (II, 294). Yet Cowper detests
affectation and mistrusts eloquence. He loves "divine simplicity" (II,
432) and therefore scourges those who "dazzle with tropes" (II, 423).
He might well have been thinking of Pope.
Pope had been dead four decades when The Task appeared, but he
still haunted Cowper. Cowper wrote more about Pope than about
any other poet of his century. He saw Pope as a giant of style but a
dwarf in moral stature (LPW 2:227), a vain and petulant poet gifted
as no other with the "studied felicity of words" (LPW 5:106). To the
publisher Joseph Johnson, Cowper wrote, "I know the ears of
modern verse-writers are delicate to an excess, and their readers are
troubled with the same squeamishness as themselves. So that if a line
do not run as smooth as quicksilver, they are offended." Then he
adds: "For this we may thank Pope; but unless we could imitate him
in the closeness and compactness of his expression, as well as in the
smoothness of his numbers, we had better drop the imitation, which
serves no other purpose than to emasculate and weaken all we write"
(LPW 1:433). To drop the imitation was no simple matter. When he
started writing The Task in October 1783, Cowper, in a mild
declaration of independence from Pope, abandoned the couplet form
he had been using. But what of the network of themes, modes,
attitudes, and voices Pope had adopted?
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Pope had also used different voices. Maynard Mack long ago
defined his main satirical personae as three: the vir bonus, or good
plain man, the naif, or ingenu, and the hero of his own verse who is
"proud to see Men not afraid of God, afraid of me."" Together these
voices "sum up, between them, what is essential in the satirist's
position." Their interplay is fundamental: "the total dramatic
development of any one of his formal satires is to a large extent
determined by the way they succeed one another, modulate and
qualify one another, and occasionally fuse with one another" (63, 62).
Mack continues:
As naif, the satirist educates us. He makes us see the ulcer
where we were accustomed to see the rouge....As vir bonus, on
the other hand, he wins our confidence in his personal moral
insight....And finally, as hero, he opens to us a world where the
discernment of evil is always accompanied, as it is not always
in the real world, by the courage to strike at it...he never lets
us forget that we are at war; there is an enemy. (63)
Something like this interplay of voices holds in Cowper, yet Mack
allows us to draw some lines between Pope and Cowper. We hear
species of naif, vir bonus, and hero in Cowper, but with very different
modulations and overall effect." Pope is wittier, more in control,
more dexterous and playful, and more savage than Cowper.
Pope more successfully deploys his voices as tactical moves of a
single, complex, persona. Perhaps one reason for this can be posited
in the relative distance Pope and Cowper create between persona as
aesthetic vehicle and persona as biographical identity. At the risk of
absurdly deflating an important issue, Cowper makes it much harder
" "The Muse of Satire," Collected in Himself: Essays Critical, Biographical, and Bibliographical
on Pope and Some of His Contemporaries (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1982), 61-2.
" One can also measure the distance between today's literary criticism and that of the 1950s
here. Mack treats these voices as rhetorical ploys inherent in a genre, satire, and insists that
we see each of the three personae and the targets of satire more as fictional and rhetorical
constructions than as portraits of the human being Pope and the people toward whom he felt
personal animus. Today a special insistence on satire as an a-historical genre, together with
one on the fictionality of self-representation, would be questioned, the first because all genres
have historical and ideological ramifications, the latter, not because the personae are real
rather than fictional, but because all discourse employs construaions of self and audience in
accordance with purpose, occasion, genre, and rhetorical strategy.

214

1650-1850

to insist, as Mack does in the case of Pope, that the voices in the
poem are as much artifice and mask as they are tones of the
biographical poet. Thomas Jemielity has observed: "Prophetic selfrevelation, like satiric self-portraiture, comes only in service to a cause
greater than the self. The potver and craft of the text is subordinated
to an ethical good."" But there is a great difference between ways of
subordinating self and text to ethical purpose. Which offers the
greater technique of subordination— artful but conscious masking or
impulsive self-revelation? Presumably, self-revelation would be more
unified, since it draws on a single though complex identity. But in
the case of Pope and Cowper, we would have to award the unity
prize to Pope. One may cavil that Cowper's implicit insistence on
the congruence of life and art is also a rhetorical artifice, but either
way one reads it, one can mark distance between Pope and Cowper
in terms of it. As a recent study comments, "The refusal to separate
the life from the writings" appeared in a number of writers in the
middle and late eighteenth century. It became a hallmark of
sentimentalism, about which more will be said."
At least we can say that Cowper objected to the agile artificiality
that Mack prized in Pope. Cowper said of Pope, "With the
unwearied application of a plodding Flemish painter who draws a
Shrimp with the most minute exactness, he had all the Genius of one
of the first Masters." However, he commented, "Never, I believe,
were such talents and such drudgery united" (LPW 2:3). In a
reenactment of a dispute as old as rhetoric itself, Cowper would not
allow rhetorical brilliance to supplant direct, situated, personally
applicable matter. He said, "Give me a manly, rough line, with a deal
of meaning in it, rather than a whole poem full of musical periods,
that have nothing but their oily smoothness to recommend them"
(LPW 1:433). Cowper is, of course, unfair to Pope, but for this study
the more important issue is how Cowper will choose to deliver his
own "deal of meaning."
Cowper also differs from Pope and his Augustan predecessors in
his rationale for satire. He therefore had to deploy his ridicule
accordingly. Edward Nathan sees two dominant languages used in
" Satire and the Hebrew Prophets (Louisville: Westminster/ John Knox Press, 1992), 157.
" John Mullan, Introduction to Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 2.
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Augustan apologies for satire, that of Dryden and that of Addison,
respectively the languages of bench and pulpit. In regard to personal
satire, the pulpit rationale landed satirists in a dilemma: Christian
charity must oppose the punitive use of the pen. The legal defense
of satire as a civic institution like courts of law invited problems as
well. Courts and judges have procedures, special clothing, language,
and architecture to signify that they a legal power in a legitimate
manner. Poetry also has its procedures and marks to signal legitimate
purpose, but these were also changing. Nathan notes;
The profound change from Dryden's to Pope's age is that the
Christian element disappears from the polemic generated by
the opposition intellectuals. Pope, Bolingbroke, Pulteney, and
their cadre are not troubled with scruples of charity as they
labor to disgrace Walpole's legions with satire as personal as
any written since the reign of Aristophanes.^^
Cowper returns us to the pulpit apology for satire and, if anything,
heightens the Christian moratorium on certain kinds of satire because
the people who inhabit The Task are in such need of brother and
sisterhood. They already feel pain. Cowper even surmises that many
deluded individuals resist renouncing their vain pursuits because "the
dread. The slavish dread of solitude" (1, 487-88) torments them.
In a recent study, David Morris interprets Pope's philosophy of
pain:
The pain of satire, as Pope employs it, deprives wickedness of
its self-insulating complacency. It forces the villainous to
experience both the reality of their unhappy state and the
unhappiness they cause others. In this office, the satirist is
merely the agent for awakening vice to its own nature. In the
satirists's hands, pain is denied even the illusion of happiness.
Prosperity, for criminals who escape the law, will not be
unmixed with torment, for the satirist ensures that knaves will
"The Bench and the Pulpit; Conflicting Elements in the Augustan Apology for Satire,"
ELH 52 (Summer 1985), 375-96; 394.
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feel a pain which is not merely the punishment of vice but also
its natural condition.''
How does Pope empower himself to cause pain when the phrase,
"criminals who escape the law" refers, as often as not, merely to
literary and social adversaries whose crime it was to be less brilliant
poets, social presences, and conversationalists than himself? Pope
authorizes Pope, but he does so, of course, in relation to a long
poet/rhetor tradition and in cooperation with readers who believe
already, or are at least willing to entertain for the sake of momentary
literary pleasure, a long series of propositions—that dullness is a vice,
that dullness matters to a society as much as crime, that Pope knows
it when he sees it, that his recognition is disinterested rather than
personal, that Pope cares enough on behalf of those made unhappy
by the vicious to help the victims get even, and that the dull, the
foolish, and the vicious deserve to feel pain. One might conclude, as
does Morris, that "satire, as a weapon, constitutes a form of literary
discourse uniquely concerned with power"and not finally with
right and wrong. Pope's practice raises serious questions about satiric
voice. If that practice is only a rhetorical fiction, one may squirm to
hear Pope's "Muse of Pain" articulated because pain is not simply a
rhetorical artifice. Someone must feel it.
Cowper lacks confidence in either kind of rationale Morris infers
from Pope. In The Task he remarks that satire (and he might well be
thinking of Pope here) lacks the force to correct any but the most
innocuous offenses in fashion and manners:
the sat'rist has at last.
Strutting and vap'ring in an empty school.
Spent all his force and made no proselyte.
(II, 329-31)
He asks;
What vice has it subdu'd? whose heart reclaim'd
By rigour, or whom laugh'd into reform?
" Alexander Pope: The Genius of Sense (Cambridgs; Harvard University Press, 1984), 240.
Morris, Genius of Sense^ 238.
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(II, 285-321)
Fair enough, yet Cowper leaves us in a dilemma. He practices satire
and writes poetry yet expresses no means to resolve the
incompatibility between his strenuous activity and the nagging doubts
as to its efficacy. This is not to say that he doesn't bluntly satirize bad
preachers and city gamblers or that he scrupulously avoids personal
satire. Nor does he completely recoil from giving pain. But he does
so standing next to his victim, not looming above in the guise of a
good-natured man who will now torture his victim, to the delight of
all onlookers. Cowper will also disclose his own corrective wounds
and his tortured anxiety that he should be the one to handle the lash.
He insists on placing himself on a field whereon all, himself included,
will be judged. Pope derives authority from genius and superiority.
No poetic rival can defeat him.
Cowper derives his from
imperfection, sympathy, and fellowship. Even when he asserts his
qualifications to give readers the thorns and briers of reproof, he does
so with hesitation and then further hedges by deferring to God, And
in this vein he offers his ultimate rationale for poetic discourse. His
is not a muse of genius, nor of pain, but of grace.
We have already examined Cowper's diffidence over the usefulness
of poetry and were left with a rationale at odds with his practice.
That is, he demanded usefulness of his own poetry and at the same
time questioned poetry's power to reform society in any profound
way. Given that he sees himself in a line not of civic poets but
Christian monitors and poet-prophets, how does he harmonize his
desire to speak the Word with his recognition that he is finally
unauthorized to do so? Milton spoke as prophet, Pope as a kind of
civic arbiter, and in the late eighteenth century, only Blake dared
utter truths divine in the mantic tradition. Yet Cowper wants to see
himself in that light.
During the time Cowper was at Westminster school and being
called to the Bar, the divinity of poetry was being reasserted.
Counter to the Augustan tradition of polished eloquence, Robert
Lowth's Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews^^ upheld the
sacred tradition that viewed poetry as the distinctive trait of divine
Given as lectures in 1741, published in Latin in 1753 and in English in 1787.
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utterance. "The logos is poetic," as Stephen Prickett states this view.^'
And if the logos is poetic, all true poetry shares in logos. Lowth
helped initiate the devaluation of the Augustan poetry of social reality
and the resurgence of a poetry that "gains its 'almost ineffable
sublimity' not from elevated terms, but from the depth and
universality of its subject matter" (Prickett, 41-42).
Naturally, this places a burden on the poet. When Collins
contemplates poetry as a divine gift that cannot be duplicated or
coerced, he despairs. But despair is not the only alternative. As
Prickett illustrates in the example of Dante, an awareness of the
futility of using human means to achieve greater-than-human ends can
be a central feature of the inspired poet's vision. And it can lead not
to utter rejection of the lower, human ways to illumination but to
their confirmation as incomplete and futile in themselves, yet as
necessary steps on the path to that illumination which makes them
inadequate and inferior. Prickett calls this phenomenon "disconflrmation." Thus a kind of paradox emerges, and of all late eighteenthcentury poets, Cowper seems most overwhelmed by it. Using all the
human means possible, knowing his insufficiency and confessing his
reluctance and unfitness, he may still take part in the divine gift.
Though "no works of man May rival these [of nature]" (I, 430-31),
Cowper still writes poetry:
I therefore recommend, though at the risk
Of popular disgust, yet boldly still.
The cause of piety and sacred truth.
And virtue, and those scenes which God ordain'd
Should best secure them and promote them most.
(Ill, 705-09)
In other words, he can still function as a poet/prophet although he
is not ordained.
The role of poet/prophet already offered many, often conflicting
modulations. To echo them was one way of inhabiting the paradox.
" Words and the Word (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1986), 41, 45. The divine
aspect of poetry has been the subject of a number of recent studies, including David Daiches,
God and the Poets (Oxford; Clarendon, 1984); James L. Kugel, ed.. Poetry and Prophecy
(Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1990); and Harold Bloom, Ruin the Sacred Truths
(Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1989).
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Thomas Jemielity's Satire and the Hebrew Prophets ai^ues that satire
predates the classical tradition to which most literary histories trace
it. It originates in the Old Testament prophets who judged and
denounced Israel. Hebrew prophets faced not only a recalcitrant
people, but other prophets who challenged their authority; they
therefore developed a number of strategies for responding.
"Inescapably, the great prophets had to sell themselves, had to convey
a character more compelling, more believable than that of the
prophets they roundly condemned as false or speciously reassuring."^®
They contended with false prophets "as with no other," charging
them with laxity, self-induced visions, licentiousness, and self-interest.
In coordinated efforts to achieve attractive self-presentation, they used
different voices—threat, mockery, curse, and mild and affectionate
pleading. Sometimes they insisted on their own unworthiness, fear,
and reluctance. And in self-defense they had to respond to the charge
to which they felt most vulnerable, that they were mad (135).^' Many
of these techniques Jemielity finds convincingly practiced in leading
eighteenth-century satirists such as Swift and Pope.
Cowper uses them, too, though with some differences. He devotes
himself to discrediting various false prophets and lax religious leaders,
and he carefully shields his self-presentation from the charge of
madness by excluding much of the actual depth and anguish of his
mental struggles. No doubt he would have liked to use propheticsatiric techniques more pointedly if he thought he had God's mandate
to do so. One threat made by the Hebrew prophets must have
seemed fulfilled in Cowper's day—that there would be no word from
on high if impersonators didn't cease. As we saw earlier, Cowper
tried his hand at prophecy in his 1782 Poems, then drew back from
touching the "solemn chords." In The Task he is somewhat equivocal
about the sources of his credibility. The closing passage in The Task,
however, articulates a rationale that leaves standing, yet circumscribes,
" Jemielity, Satire, 122.
" Additionally, Jemielity identifies a generic feature of prophetic satire that we also find in
The Task and which has taken much critical effort to explain. That is its looseness of
structure. The prophetic text often begins with a narrative gesture, but the "narrative frame
vanishes almost instantly" and the "text proceeds as utterance." For two other readings of
The Task' s structure, see James King, "William Cowper's New Aesthetic in The Task " Studies
on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 264(1989), 1080-84; and Dustin Griffin, "Redefining
Georgic: Cowper's Task,"
57(1990), 865-79.
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all the potential incompatibilities in the voices he has used. When he
has died, says Cowper,
It shall not grieve me, then, that once, when call'd
To dress a Sofa with the flow'rs of verse,
I play'd awhile, obedient to the fair.
With that light task; but soon, to please her more.
Whom flow'rs alone I knew would little please.
Let fall th' unfinish'd wreath, and rov'd for fruit;
Rov'd far, and gather'd much: some harsh, 'tis true,
Pick'd from the thorns and briers of reproof,
But wholesome, well-digested; grateful some
To palates that can taste immortal truth;
Insipid else, and sure to be despis'd.
But all is in his hand whose praise I seek.
In vain the poet sings, and the world hears.
If he regard not, though divine the theme.
(VI, 1006-1019)
In this complicated, and perhaps flawed, rhetoric Cowper makes
four moves to resolve the uncertainties he has expressed throughout
The Task about the writing and reading of poetry. First, he avows
different voices on different themes. He has even left some work (the
"wreath") unfinished. Second, the power to announce and validate
divine themes and "immortal truths" does not reside in human
agency. Third, he acknowledges the reader's role in the fulfillment
of the poet's task. Without denying the determining role of the
poetic text on the reader and the consequent need for careful
execution of the poet's purposes, and without implying that all
readers have equally valuable responses (some palates "can taste
immortal truth"; some can't), Cowper writes the reader's freedom
into the text. The reader is free to play with flowers or cull the fruit,
maybe both. Fourth, Cowper leaves himself and readers in the power
of a higher authority, so whether they applaud him or not matters
little. Of course, he hopes that God will warrant his work, but
knowing his own limits, he can hardly hope for wholesale confirm
ation. What matters more is that he has tried to use his finite and
incomplete gifts for a cause higher than they can reach. This move
reminds reader and writer that the only true effectuality resides in
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something beyond the social and rhetorical bond created between
writer and reader. Only a power beyond them can determine
whether Cowper's utterances will accomplish any lasting good. This
move doesn't negate human effort and skill, but it leaves final power
in a site where the most superlative human effort and skill alone
cannot arrive.
Poetry thus merges with religion, the second context we will
examine, and one that for Cowper superseded anything else in the
poem in importance. If his ancestry as prophet-satirist allowed
multiple modulations, the nature of his religious sentiments required
them. To appreciate their nature and their necessity, we need to look
at Cowper's use of biblical echoes and at the conflicts within
evangelical Protestantism generally as to the sources of spiritual
authority. We also need to examine the phenomenon of conversion
by grace, particularly as it was explained by Cowper's friend and
mentor, John Newton.
Of his poem's religious content, Cowper wrote to a friend: "Were
I to write as many Volumes as Lopez de Vega or Voltaire not one of
them would be without this tincture. If the world like it not, so
much the worse for them." In the same letter, however, Cowper
confessed that he avoided expressing explicit religious sentiments early
in the poem so that he "might not revolt the Reader at his entrance"
and so his "best impressions might be made last" (LPW 2:284). The
combination of concession and deference with a "here I stand" finality
relate to Cowper's religious experience as an evangelical Anglican.
Cowper perceived two issues that impinge on each other. First,
anyone who preached religious doctrine or ethics must exemplify
them in his or her life, yet, second, one of Cowper's persuasion could
hardly proclaim one's own fitness except in a special way that nearly
reverses the ordinary worthiness claim: essentially, one had to depict
oneself as an unworthy recipient of the unique acts of grace one has
experienced, yet as empowered by those acts of grace to proclaim
truths of which one is supremely confident. To complicate matters,
experience had taught Cowper that it was more difficult in matters of
religion than in any other facet of life to discern the authentic article
from the sham. Theoretically, these are very separate issues. Truth
is truth no matter who states it. Yet in evangelical Christianity, with
the traditional Christian moral imperatives amplified by a more
urgent need for example, and lacking the institutional accreditations
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that mainstream Anglicans enjoyed, the truth of a proposition and the
behavior of the person who stated it blurred into each other. One
year before he began composing The Task, Cowper wrote:
Men who profess themselves adepts in mathematical knowl
edge, in astronomy or jurisprudence, are generally as well
qualified as they would appear. The reason may be, that they
are always liable to detection, should they attempt to impose
upon mankind, and therefore take care to be what they
pretend. In Religion alone, a profession is often slightly taken
up and slovenly carried on, because forsooth candor and
charity require us to hope the best and to judge favorably of
our neighbor, and because it is easy to deceive the ignorant
who are a majority upon this subject. Let a man attach himself
to a particular party, contend furiously for what are properly
called evangelical doctrines, and enlist himself under the banner
of some popular preacher, and the business is done. Behold a
Christian, a Saint, a Phoenix! In the mean time perhaps his
heart and his temper, and even his conduct are unsanctified,
possibly less exemplary than those of some avowed Infidels.
No matter—he can talk—he has the Shibboleth of the true
Church—the Bible in his pocket and a head well stored with
notions. (LPW 2:81-82)
The problems of voice and authority could hardly be stated more
clearly.
A Bible in the pocket was not a sufficient cause of spiritual
authority, but it was a necessary one. Devout believers thought that
truth tended to twist or tangle in the individual, and society
inevitably worsened the tangle; the Word stood outside to confirm
the truth and rectify reasoning. Gerald Marshall has shown that
Cowper draws on scripture for both content and phrasing. Cowper
had said as much in a letter to John Newton, "I have admitted into
my description no images but what are scriptural, and have aimed as
exactly as I could at the plain and simple sublimity of Scripturelanguage" (LPW 2:300).'^
" The use of biblical language was hardly exclusive to Cowper. Janel Mueller demonstrates
that a major influence on the development of English prose style was Scripturalism, "a
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As Marshall interprets it, Cowper invites us to read his poem
as though it were a Scriptural text, and he has a narrative voice
that [the reader] is now asked to "hear" as though it were a
Biblical voice.
Ultimately, this technique becomes an
important symbolic element of the poem: it suggests that the
poetic text gives priority to the scriptural text which it has,
essentially, become; that the poem speaks with greater force
and dignity when it permits the Word to consume the mere
poet's words with its own holy presence.
Marshall has this right. However, the Bible contains many voices
ranging from commandment to lament, from celebration to anathema.
To echo particular passages is to activate particular associations,
expectations, and positions in relation to God, audiences, and
occasions for speaking. Additionally, unless it can be presumed that
God has authorized any person who understands the Word to act as
demi-prophet, how can one preempt the sound of scripture? Even
admitting the general right and privilege to sound like the Bible, such
a privilege brings with it the possibility of imposture. When Cowper
contemplates the prophetic mantle, he demurs. "Sweet is the harp of
prophecy," he confesses admiringly, then he immediately con
cedes—"too sweet Not to be wronged by mere human touch" (VI,
747-48). And his is a human touch. He allows himself to be similar
to a prophet only in this, that his "theme divinely fair" is an "impulse
and a spur" harder to resist than to follow.
Self-conscious about the dilemmas of acting as moral monitor in
his own day, Cowper wishes for a world that doesn't confuse error
for truth and vice for virtue. The past seems to offer this kind of
clarity, but in contemplating it, he discovers a problem with the soft,
beckoning voice of Christianity. Time was, he says, when "virtue
and vice had boundaries," and sin was punished with a "wholesome
rigour."
writer's absorption with the text of the Bible and with rendering its meaning in English—an
absorption so intense as to mark the writer's own style with the impress of Biblical modes
of expression." The Native Tongue and the Word (Chicago; University of Chicago Press,
1984), 40.
W. Gerald Marshall, "The Presence of 'the Word' in Cowper's The Task," Studies in English
Literature 1500-1900 27(1987), 485.
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Men, too, were nice of honour in those days
And judg'd offenders well. (Ill, 75, 85-6)
To restore truth, Cowper can attempt to sharpen the moral
boundaries, as he often does when he excoriates adultery, vanity, and
false learning. He can also speak in his, and the Bible's, softer voices
and invite others to lives of charity, foigiveness, and toleration. Yet
if the hard voice has authenticity problems, the soft has unwanted
results. Cowper observes that the Christian emphasis on charity has
colluded to blur the boundaries between vice and virtue and to foil
the aggressive punishment of sinners:
We are become so candid and so fair.
So lib'ral in construction, and so rich
In Christian charity, (good-natur'd age!)
That they are safe, sinners of either sex. (Ill, 93-6)
Charity, forgiveness, and non-judgment, generally considered the
highest expressions of Christian living, have hampered society's power
to motivate and enforce moral injunctions. The man who shelters his
rabbit from the hunters, who exercises pity as a foundation of society,
and considers sympathy as a sign of virtue (VI, 321-482) feels sharply
the pull between such best quaUties that seem to foment error and a
hard virtue he has difficulty qualifying to preach. Rather than sustain
either voice, he alternates between them.
This was not just Cowper's problem. Contrary pulls and
alternations, made in the hope that alternations will mend the
deficiencies of any single voice, have deep foundations in evangelical
Christianity. Cowper preempts some powers of the pulpit, knowing
that he is not called or ordained to do so, but also knowing that even
the pulpit succeeds not by the preacher's gifts, but by a spiritual
intervention. From the Reformation on. Christian sects had stressed
different orderings and combinations of tradition, church hierarchy,
holy scripture, and individual spiritual inspiration as their warrant to
truth. To take a well known example, Dryden's Religio Laid is riven
by such stresses. Close study of the Bible and individual inspiration
were challenging tradition and church hierarchy at the very moment
when historical study was undermining the authenticity of bibUcal
texts, and when divine inspiration had shown itself to be volatile and
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disruptive of the general welfare. The most stable source of religious
truth, the Bible, had been used controversially by so many groups
over so many years that scripture citation had, to moderate minds,
lost some of its proof-ability and did as much to divide as to unite.
If anything, ministers and priests vied to appropriate Biblical tropes
more frequently, expertly, and wittily than their opponents. Further,
biblical interpretation in the century was undergoing a transformation
away from literalness, a phenomenon that Hans Frei has explored in
The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. In this situation, the advantages of
claiming the individual workings of the holy spirit were apparent to
many believers.
As an evangelical Anglican, Cowper had specific doctrinal
affinities that could be expressed in such terms. He favored grace
over duty, the Bible over the councils and traditions and creeds of the
church, and the workings of the spirit over the hierarchies of the
established church, which he thoroughly despised (LPW 2T33-34).
Even The Whole Duty of Man (1658), which probably had more sway
over minds and hearts than any book in the period except the Bible,
contained bad doctrine to Cowper. He called it "that repository of
self-righteousness and pharisaical lumber" (LPW 1:17) because it
stressed duty and doing over grace and heart. Personal spiritual
promptings bestowed an immediate and "experimental" knowledge on
believers and provided an intensity that many of them found lacking
in mainstream Anglican worship. Individual inspiration, however,
was hardly problem-free. Swift identified its dominant tendencies in
The Tale of a Tub. That is, devotees of the spirit spoke could wallow
in anti-social grotesqueness and, at the same time, bawl out their
views as if anyone who questioned them were inviting immediate
damnation. And, of course, one had only to listen to four or five
such people claiming divine inspiration to notice how inconsistent
and socially disruptive the spirit could be.
The dangers of inspiration were contained to a laige extent from
within the spiritual community. They were hedged by a rhetoric of
grace and spirit that began with early reformers such as Luther and
Calvin and revived in the evangelical movement. Indeed, wherever
Calvinism strongly influenced doctrine, there appeared the paradox of
the depraved human exerting God-like spiritual authority. The
rhetoric established a normative language and ethos in which the
inner prompting of the spirit could be shared with others in a way
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that would itself be the sign of authentic spiritual experience and
authority.
John Newton mastered that language and that ethos, and in his
modulations we hear the tones that Cowper echoed. John Newton
was an Anglican evangelical minister and a "zealot with a maddening
certainty about his own actions."^'* He exerted a dominant forcesome say a harmful one—on Cowper's life from 1767, when Cowper
moved to Olney, until 1780, when Newton took a pulpit in London.
After he left, he and Cowper corresponded regularly, but Cowper no
longer stood so much in his shade. From London Newton wrote to
reproach Cowper's companion, Mrs. Unwin, for the scandal she and
Cowper were causing by living in the same house and making
excursions together. Cowper sent back a cordial but blunt letter to
Newton, justifying the friendship because providence had favored it
(LPW 2: 591-93). As Quinlan observes, "Such a letter, especially to
Newton, Cowper could not have written ten years earlier."^' After
Newton left, Cowper began writing more regularly on longer projects
and ventured to publish his work. The Pmgress of Error appeared in
a collection in 1782; it was followed by The Task in 1785.
One of Newton's most constant preoccupations involved the
dilemma that he and other evangelical preachers faced. Those who
take it upon themselves to preach must be exemplary believers, yet
believers can never trust in themselves or their own gifts. Richard
Frost, in a sermon preached on the ordination of a new minister,
asks.
Who among the Sons of Adam, who dwell in Houses of Clay,
and who, beside the Weakness of their Nature, have the Leaven
of Folly and Sin mingling in all their Performances, is sufficient
to sustain the Burden of such an Office, and equal thereto?
The Reply is, "None of themselves are sufficient for it; and the
Maurice J. Quinlan, William Cowper: A Critical Life (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota
Press, 1953), 76. Not everyone agrees that Newton's influence harmed Cowper, but however
good or bad his influence, my point remains that Cowper was emerging from it in the years
preceding The Task. Even Gilbert Thomas, who renders Newton in the most positive light,
agrees that Cowper had been "dependent upon the friendship" and that "it was to [Cowper's]
ultimate advantage that Newton, in 1780, was called to London," William Cowper and the
Eighteenth Century (London: Ivor, Nicholson, and Watson, 1935), 259.
Quirflan, William Cowper, 150.
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few who are so, are indebted to the Grace of God for the
sufficiency they have."^^
The situation is like a balancing act involving the preacher's dual
character, God's grace, and an audience: the weight of authority shifts
every time one stresses a given element. Preachers must always bear
in mind their own extreme lack of merit for the divine favor they
have received, yet without their exemplary lives, their qualifications
to preach are immediately in question, yet divine grace is a free gift
and not earned, even by an exemplary life. The preacher's insufficien
cy must be delicately conveyed to an audience, however, so that it
strengthens rather than undermines his fitness as God's minister.
In an alert, trained, believing mind such as Newton's, one
consequently sees two branches of gospel rhetoric, a firm declaration
on points of doctrine and practice, and a carefully worded disclaimer
about the preacher's life were it devoid of grace. Newton's words,
"Amazing grace...that saved a wretch like me," sum up the formula,
and Cowper was aware, in a typically self-conscious fashion, of both
the self-deprecating and self-aggrandizing inclinations to which it gives
vent. He said, "There is that in the nature of salvation by grace when
it is truly and experimentally known which prompts every person to
think himself the most extraordinary instance of its power.
Newton modeled such an attitude frequently. He wrote:
I must take deserved shame to myself, that I have made very
unsuitable returns for what I have received. But if the question
is only concerning the patience and long-suffering of God, the
wonderful interposition of his providence in favour of an
unworthy sinner, the power of his grace in softening the
hardest heart, and the richness of his mercy in pardoning the
most enormous and aggravated transgressions; in these respects,
I know no case more extraordinary than my own. (WJN 1:10)^®
In another typical passage, Newton says of himself.
The Importance of the Ministerial Ofice, and the Difficulty of Rightly Discharging It (London,
1745), 5.
Adelphi^ in Letters and Prose Writings^ 1:59.
The Works of the Rev. John Newton^ 4 vols, (New Haven: 1824), 1:10. Hereafter cited in
the text as WJN.
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with respect to my acceptance in the Beloved, I know not if I
have had a doubt of a quarter of an hour's continuance for
many year's past. But, Oh! the multiplied instances of
stupidity, ingratitude, impatience, and rebellion, to which my
conscience has been witness! (WJN 1:120)
Cowper's blend of diffidence and authoritativeness can find a source
here, yet it can be refined further.
Newton had no doubts about the almighty's grace as it extended
to him. Cowper, more Calvinistic than Newton, had plenty.
Newton had actually characterized Cowper's type of awakening and
despair in his writings, and it may be wondered whether Newton
might have been describing his friend in the general pattern. His
description locates men such as Cowper as beings arrested in the
progress of grace.
Newton likened this process to a plant's
developmental stages of blade, ear, and full corn. One in the "blade"
stage is awakened to a conviction of sin and feels the joy and
restfulness of spiritual comfort, yet that person "often questions his
willingness; and not knowing the aboundings of grace, and the
security of the promises, he fears lest the compassionate Saviour
should spurn him from his feet" (WJN 1:115). Also, unlike one more
mature in grace whose stubborn heart and knowledge of the world's
snares "teach him to make all due allowances" in tenderness of spirit
toward the sins of others, one in the "blade" stage is often a blamer,
"the warmth of his zeal not being duly corrected by a sense of his
own imperfections."
Newton calls this type of Christian "a
censorious spirit" (WJN 1: 123).
Cowper saw this trait in himself. He linked his occasional
outbursts of invective to his spiritual awakening. "Before my
conversion," he wrote, "I was seldom tempted to anger, yet that
passion is at present, of all others, that with which I have the sharpest
conflict, and which gives me the most disturbance" {Adelphi, LPW
1:41). Newton also said of neophytes of the faith that they
have just seen the wonderful works of the Lord, and they
cannot but sing his praise; they are deeply affected with the
danger they have lately escaped, and with the case of
multitudes around them, who are secure and careless in the
same alarming situation! and a sense of their own mercies, and
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a compassion for the souls of others, is so transporting that
they can hardly forbear preaching to every one they meet. (WJN
1:259, emphasis mine)
Furthermore, according to Newton, persons young in the
experience of grace don't grasp the necessity of conflict and continued
effort in their progress to the maturity of the "full corn." "The
comforts which are intended as cordials to animate them against the
opposition of an unbelieving world, they mistake and rest in as the
proper evidences of their hope" (WJN 1:260). Whether Newton
accurately describes the traits of incomplete spiritual development
would be hard to ascertain. It can be ascertained that the traits he
identifies—self-doubt, wavering, censoriousness, and monitory
impetuousness—find expression in Cowper. One may, again, wonder
whether Cowper fits a pattern, or whether the pattern is derived
partly from Cowper. If Cowper sensed in any degree that Newton
drew him, it may explain why Cowper decided not to offer his
longest poem for Newton's comment and assistance in publication.
It may also explain Cowper's defensiveness on the point of idleness.
If so, Newton stands menacingly over the poem's religious ethos as
Pope stands over its poetic.
Psychologically speaking, the sermons of a person going to hell
might have great interest, but in the eyes of a devout congregation,
that is the last person qualified to ascend the pulpit. But properly
interpreted, even Cowper's sense of depravity served as a link with
others. A watershed moment in Cowper's recursive conversion
experience occurred when the dissenter Martin Madan visited him at
Dr. Cotton's hospital in St. Albans, where Cowper was recovering
from his Lxjndon suicide attempt and mental breakdown. Cowper
describes it this way: "he began to declare to me the Gospel. While
he spoke of original sin and the corruption of every man born into
the world, whereby we are all children of wrath, without any
difference, I perceived something like a glimpse of hope dawning in
my heart." The glimpse is not the hope of rescue, which Madan is yet
to describe, but the feeling of commonality. "This doctrine set me
more upon a level with the rest of mankind and made my condition
appear to me less desperate" {Adelphi, LPW 1:29). Notice that the
mentally anguished Cowper needs little persuasion that he is a child
of wrath. What he grasps at is the prospect that others resembled
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himself. Once he had made this type of commonality familiar, the
combined qualities to be heard in his soft voice—despair, diffidence,
woundedness, refuge, and inadequacy for the moral combat of
heroes—hardly disqualify him from addressing his fellow humans.
They make him kin.
Whatever the path by which Cowper arrived at his voices of
diffidence and denunciation, they can be heard in his depiction of the
pulpit. Cowper reverences the pulpit and its "with solemn awe" as
"the most important and effectual guard. Support, and ornament of
virtue's cause" (II, 327, 335-36). The good life provides a test of one's
possessing truth and a validation one's right to announce it. "I
venerate the man...Whose hands are pure, whose doctrine and whose
life. Coincident" (II, 373-75). He generally conveys a dismal view of
the pulpit, however. He reserves his hottest anger for the preacher
"loose in naorals, and in manners vain,...ambling and prattling scandal
as he goes." "From such apostles," he prays, "preserve the church"
(II, 378-93). "Pulpits fail," he sums up (III, 21). He abominates
preachers who "play tricks," "indulge a silly fond conceit," and "starve
[the] flock," and who use the "stare and start theatric, practised at the
glass" (II, 419-31). He detests the "nasal twang" of the conventicle
ministers who preach
and then relapse into themselves.
And, having spoken wisely, at the close
Grow wanton, and give proof to ev'ry eye—
Whoe'er was edified, themselves were not! (II, 436-44)
It may be a bit perverse to read these lines as Cowper's self-portrait,
but doing so draws attention once again to the enormous effort
Cowper invested in a poem whose purposes include peace of mind.
In the context of pulpit rhetoric, the issue of using many voices
reflected the desire to reach all types of a diverse audience. Isaac
Watts had called this adaptation "distinguishing the Characters of our
Hearers, and dividing the Word aright to Saints and Sinriers."^' Philip
Doddridge, a dissenting minister whom Cowper admired along with
Watts as the one of the greatest names in divinity, suggested the
® Dedication to Sermons, The Works of the Rev. Isaac Watts, D.D., ed. E. Parson, 7 vols,
(Leeds; 1800), Lxxvii.
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philosophical study of the human affections as the rational basis for
knowing "how to awaken or moderate their passions by proper
application to them."'° Isabel Rivers has reported: "Doddridge
distinguishes several 'strains' of preaching, the argumentative, pathetic,
insinuating, evangelical, spiritual and experimental, and scriptural.
These strains, he argues, are not only compatible with each other but
ought to be found in every sermon.'"'
It would be possible to turn explanations for Cowper's yoking of
disparate voices into evidence that he had succeeded in fashioning a
complex but unified persona. He seems not to have wanted that.
Cowper the Calvinist can't easily believe he has invented a completely
satisfactory poetic, any more than spiritual, ethos. A tradition in
Protestant preaching holds that the preacher doesn't bring about a
congregation's conversion or renewal. He merely induces spiritual
crisis and need. The real work toward which the sermon tends is
achieved as the holy spirit takes hold of the moment opened up by
the heart's crisis to perform its work of conviction, cleansing, and
conversion. Preachers may utilize all the powers and gifts they
have—reason, impassioned eloquence, terror, testimony, rhapsody,
admonition, etc.—but these gifts and strategies only do what Paul's
donkey did on his trip to Damascus—bring him to where direct,
diyine action can take place. Without that last stage, sermons are
only so many donkeys and nothing more.
Cowper wants to be considered for the same journey. It doesn't
then matter so much whether he has the minister's call and
ordination. What matters is that he knows his incompleteness as a
human personality.
Why then bother with constructing an
aesthetically convincing identity? Better to sense the seductive
fictionality of such an identity and to stay this side of it. The
contradictions he avows make the grace appeal all the more necessary,
and Cowper doesn't seem to be so bothered by the threat of being
found wanting that he must resolve the contradictions as a condition
for his authority.
"Lecture 15" in A Course of Lectures [1762], The Works of the Reu Philip Doddridge, D.D.,
ed. E. Williams and E. Parsons (Leeds: 1802-1805), 4: 330.
" Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England,
1660-1780, Vol. 1: Whichcote to Wesley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 191.
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An intriguing passage in The Task explores this paradox: humans
are frail and passion-driven, yet they are subject to laws so strict that
only perfect beings can live them. Is this a trap, he asks?
Hath God indeed giv'n appetites to man
And stor'd the earth so plenteously with means
To gratify the hunger of his wish;
And doth he reprobate, and will he damn.
The use of his own bounty? making first
So frail a kind, and then enacting laws
So strict, that less than perfect must despair?
(V, 635-41)
Cowper immediately dismisses this view as "Falsehood! which...Dis
honors God, and makes a slave of man" (V, 642-43), yet he can't
refute it, any more than he can provide a definition after asking
"What is truth" (III, 269)? In the present passage he calls for the
philosopher to expose its errors, implicitly conceding that he cannot
solve the logical cul de sac into which his own Calvinism would lead
him. However, the philosopher's call to fitness and moral sense fail
to achieve their final objective, to reclaim those bound in wrong
beliefs. Ultimately he rejects the view that humans are caught in a
no-win life, not because he can prove it wrong, but because it leads
to despair—a despair that he seems to have known. The only escape
from the dilemma for Cowper lies in a means the philosopher would
disdain—God's grace, a miraculous inner work by which such
treacherous life-gaps are filled and fatal paradoxes mended. Left to
their own devices, humans will remain trapped, but that doesn't make
the trap inescapable. Grace can transform people; only "grace makes
the slave a freeman" (V, 688).
Cowper cannot speak as prophet, and his poetry denounces evils
he has no hope of correcting. But he can point to grace, that
something else that compensates for human incapacity, even for the
incapacity to explain why one who "would not trifle" writes poetry
without ultimate confidence in its efficacy. After all he can do, he,
like all other humans he knows, lacks the power to effect change in
others, so he defers any claim to authority and rests in God's grace.
He is then free to speak the truth as he knows it and leave the effects
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to a transaction between readers and divinity. Fragmentation is a sign
of true knowledge.
Cowper's invitation to philosophers to join him in refuting the
life-defeating paradox leads us to the third context of Cowper's voices,
that of ethical philosophy. Even though Cowper disliked contempo
rary theories of ethics, he follows some of the main contours of late
eighteenth-century ethical thought. He places sympathy in circulation
among himself, readers, and textual objects of pity, and he seems
implicitly to view sensibility or sympathetic fellowship as a warrant
for moral authority. Pathos becomes the sufficient cause of moral
insight and the necessary, though not sufficient, cause of moral
authority.
Cowper's fame rests partly on his role as a great sympathizer and
fellow human. His sympathetic faculties create compassion for the
slave, the insane, the hungry child, and the abused animal. However,
Cowper's most explicit claim to fellowship occurs where we would
least expect it, in an extended attack on intellectual and scientific
endeavors he detested. In the midst of this attack, he anticipates this
objection from a "sage erudite":
'Twere well, could you permit the world to live
As the world pleases. What's the world to you.'
(Ill, 194-95)
Cowper answers, "Much." He cannot turn completely away from
vain city dwellers or from the falsely learned critics and scientists; he,
too, is human, born of woman. "I think, articulate, I laugh and
weep...How then should I and any man that lives Be strangers to each
other" (III, 198-201)? To be "strangers" here has curious valences. It
means to isolate oneself from others, to do one's thinking, laughing,
and weeping in solitude. These common activities can be shared, but
they can be done in isolation. To "articulate" is different; it is
necessarily social. And part of articulating entails correcting others
when perceived as necessary. Failing to correct equals a denial of
common humanity. For Cowper, fellowship is duty, arid, as we saw
above in the section on religion, a person's failings, however grave,
don't necessarily disqualify him or her from fulfilling that duty: a
biting sense of depravity can be converted into fellow-feeling.
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Cowper is often discussed as an example of sensibility, but he
rejected the moral philosophy of his day upon which the value of
sensibility was articulated. In Book V he weighs out a plausible view
of the human condition that we just examined, that humans are
essentially trapped by God. Cowper turns to contemporary ethical
thinkers for help but doesn't find it;
Haste now, philosopher, and set him free.
Charm the deaf serpent wisely. Make him hear
Of rectitude and fitness, moral truth
How lovely, and the moral sense how sure.
(V, 670-73)
He mocks such terms, even if expressed in "poetic trappings" that
"out-mantle all the pride of verse" (V, 679-80). In the last two lines
quoted above one sees a three-pronged attack aimed at the rationalists,
the moral sense school of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson,'^ and poetethicists, perhaps like Pope in Essay on Man. All of these would
persuade people to doctrines that lack the power to change them in
the first place. What seems most interesting is that even though
Cowper rejects both the rationalist and moral-sense schools of
thought, and even though his religious beliefs run counter to the
benevolist current in ethical thought, his actual practice mirrors his
century's attempts to locate morality in the feelings and a concomi
tant move to posit the central role of sympathy in the social and
moral system.
The century's leading ethics philosophers were formulating
psychological and social theories of good and evil that avoided biblical
authority mires and other external derivations of good and evil.
These thinkers don't deny Cod's role as an ultimate source of morals,
but they seek to define the faculties or mechanisms by which humans
of diverse belief differentiate for themselves between good and evil
and are motivated toward the good.
The Earl of Shaftesbury insisted that virtue resides in the inner
disposition toward good, not in actions that may be motivated by any
"Rectitude and fitness" remind one of Samuel Clarke; "moral sense how sure" points to
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.
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number of other incentives.'' A person who gives bread to the
hungry in order to purchase applause or avoid censure is circumspect
but not good. Francis Hutcheson's An Inquiry into the Original of our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725) named that inner disposition the
moral sense, an immediate and disinterested force that attracts people
to good. Hutcheson's student Adam Smith wrote The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759) to explain how moral duty is derived—from
psychological and social, not rational or innate, foundations.
Although Smith is not as optimistic about human nature as many of
his contemporaries, he importantly described the process by which
the individual infers ideas of good and bad. The individual observes
others and imagines the self in similar situations. The individual then
reflects on the link between others' actions and one's own to form
ideas of duty. This might be called a process of sympathetic
comparison. However, since this theory grounds itself on the isolated
individual ("We have no immediate experience of what other men
feel...but by conceiving what we ourselves would feel in the like
situation."''') it does not authorize one person's views over those of
another, except through the appeal to those very faculties. Any
authority implicit in Smith's ethics becomes avowedly social and
rhetorical. That is, one must create it in cooperation with others
through shared acts of imagination. In this light, this passage in The
Task takes on significance:
It seems the part of wisdom, and no sin
Against the law of love, to measure lots
With less distinguished than ourselves; that thus
We may with patience bear our mod'rate ills.
And sympathise with others, suff'ring more.
(IV, 336-40)
Note the two steps: one draws patience from observing the less
fortunate and gives back sympathy; sympathy apparently benefits
both the one who gives it and the one who suffers.
"An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit," in Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions,
Times (1711), Part III.
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: 1853; rpt. New York: Augustus
Kelly, 1966), 3.
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The psychological and rhetorical configuration of authority
conceals several paradoxes, however, for which I believe Cowper
tries to compensate. If morality has an affective foundation, how does
it compel any but the individual.' For R. F. Brissenden, this issue lay
submerged in Hutcheson and Hume and surfaced clearly in Smith,
but without satisfactory resolution.'^. To formulate it in social terms,
if people confer authority, is it really authority at all? As Dryden had
said of the political sphere, "Then kings are slaves to those whom
they command." In the absence of divine coercive power, how does
right living remain consequential and imperative? Another question
emei^es from a study of late eighteenth-century ethics. If factors in
our psychology or sociality adequately explain our experience of good
and evil, why do so many transgress their duty? To put it as John
Mullan has, if the private resources of feeling are viewed as sources of
social understanding, how can that social understanding ever be more
than particular and private? "How can a language of feeling explain
social relations as such" (15-16)? Or to frame it in terms more
germane to The Task, if sympathy, common sense, the desire for
happiness, and harmony with the natural environment all cooperate
to guide us to the truth, why do five-sixths of humanity (to use
Cowper's ratio, which, incidentally, would include the rural areas
where truth supposedly comes easiest) drift into empty dreams and
delusions?
The latter question remains a problem both for Cowper and his
contemporary theorists. The prior question, how does individual
disposition and reflection become a duty, can be answered by
repeating that such inner actions are already part social, and the
discussion of them is both a social and rhetorical act that engages
persons in each other's experience as morally constituted individuals
in society. To borrow a distinction from Thomas Reid, there are
both solitary and social acts of the mind, the latter being any kind
that "presupposes the existence and (in some sense) presence of
another mind or other minds." To be social, such acts also require
"a community of signs so that mutual understanding is possible."''
"Authority, Guilt, and Anxiety in The Theory of Moral Sentiments^ Texas Studies in
Literature and Language 11(1969), 945-62.
Knut Haakonssen, ed., Thomas Reid: Practical Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990), 66.
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Language is one part of that community of signs, and as David Hume
had observed, some language is already inherently normative:
There are certain terms in every language, which import blame,
and others praise; and all men who use the same tongue, must
agree in their application of them.,..But when critics come to
particulars, this seeming unanimity vanishes; and it is found,
that they had affixed a very different meaning to their
expressions."
These factors allow those in discourse to take part in the act of
judgment and therefore in the exercise of moral authority. Who
wouldn't condemn acts that by their naming already imply
condemnation? When Cowper calls certain preachers vain, silly,
affected, shame-defying, loose, scandal-prattling, frivolous, rapacious,
ignorant, slothful, ambitious, and trick playing prostitutes of the holy
office, who can quarrel with his allegation that these traits are wrong
for such an office? But the unanimity would vanish as soon as they
"come to particulars" and specify which scholars are triflers and
which preachers wanton. Cowper can therefore be said to exercise
moral authority simply by the act of communicating in normative
language. We could say that his moral authority as constituted here
is a consequence of language and therefore available to everyone. Nor
is it incompatible with the benevolent expression of sympathy. They
are different kinds of expression, but their incompatibility is a matter
of degree.
Cowper also exhibits and comments upon the exercise of
sympathetic feeling. Those acts, too, are part of a sign system he
shares with many contemporary readers. To return to Reid's
distinction, sympathy is an apparently solitary act, but it is actually
social in that it requires the existence of others. And its expression,
often done with the appearance of solitude, is therefore a doubly
social act that capitalizes on the illusion of privacy. Earlier I referred
to the refusal in sentimental literature to "separate the life from the
writings." Janet Todd expresses it this way: "In all forms of
sentimental literature, there is an assumption that life and literature
" "Of the Standard of Taste," Four Dissertations (London, 1757; rpt. New York: Garland,
1970), 204.
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are directly linked, not through any notion of a mimetic depiction of
reality but through the belief that the literary experience can
intimately affect the living one."'® The exchange of sympathetic
feeling in a shared sign system binds all together: persona with actual
writer, textual objects of sympathy and persona with the actual
distressed, and implied readers with living persons who hold his book
in their hands.
Cowper sees that certain affections and sensibilities are nearly
universal. When he says, "There is in souls a sympathy with sounds"
and that chords "are touch'd within us, and the heart replies" (VI,
1-5), or that anyone "not pleased With the sight of animals enjoying
life" is "unfit For human fellowship" and "devoid of sympathy" (VI,
321-23), or that we must compare ourselves with the less fortunate
and so grow in both patience and sympathy (IV, 333-40), he refers to
a lesser version of God's word planted in each soul, an affective
faculty that feels right and wrong in and through the lot of others.
Right manifests itself in our happiness and in a sympathy that feels
others' fate augment or diminish our own. Reason and common
sense add their guidance; all these work together best in domestic
settings in the country. Ironically, too much society perverts the
exchange of feeling that makes society possible.
To appeal to an audience in whom he vests great powers of
sympathy. Cower must offer himself through a textual identity on
whom readers can bestow their feelings. This identity is patient,
humble, devoted to his God, keenly aware of his own failings, and
aware of suffering. According to the ethics of sympathy, such traits
belong to the best persons. To display them toward others not only
creates sympathy but establishes a morally credible ethos. Adam
Smith had observed, "The man who feels most for the joys and
sorrows of others, is best fitted for acquiring the most complete
control of his own joys and sorrows."'' Cowper seems to want to
bear out this relationship between feeling and control of his own joys
and sorrows. He quivers with pity for others and bids readers also to
sympathize with them and so qualify themselves for greater personal
moral control. The sympathy circulates further. Cowper asks
readers to contemplate his own suffering. In that way, readers see
Sensibility: An Introduction (London: Methuen, 1986), 4.
Smith, Theory^ 214.
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him as an object of sympathy who puts his joys and sorrows on
display so that readers can increase their own moral control.
Speaking of mercy for the slave, he enjoins: "Spread it then, And let
it circulate through ev'ry vein Of all your empire" (II, 44-6). So
managed, the circulation of sympathy converts into a kind of
authority, not the prophetic sublime, but one bestowed on those
whom readers trust to engage the imagination in a way that
strengthens moral resolve.
Cowper's three-sided sympathy requires delicate handling,
however, so that it doesn't too readily deconstruct. Readers' conferral
of authority hinges upon that element of trust. Readers must be able
to draw a thick line between the speaker and those he attacks. If he
carries traits of the gilded social butterfly, the vain preacher, the
gypsy vagabond, the over-wise scholar, the adulterer, or the news
monger, then the pot calls the kettle black. And if he is too much a
Crazy Kate, his soft voice loses moral authority and dissolves in
gratuitous pity—if pity in such a system can ever be gratuitous. This
problem affected texts of sensibility generally. Novelists of the period
"actually found it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the
figure of the virtuous hero or, more especially, heroine, and that of
the sadly distracted and isolated hysteric.'"'° Preachers of the period
knew it as the risk of too much affection in their sermons. One
danger was that one might mistake sympathetic feeling toward
textually created identities for active sympathy for real people. In a
chapter on "Affectionate Religion" Isabel Rivers notes:
Both Watts and to a greater extent Doddridge were aware of
the possible inconsistencies and dangers in the use of the
rhetoric of the affections, of which they duly warned their
readers, and hence they were often themselves remarkably
cautious in employing the rhetorical methods they advocated
for others. The problem essentially is whether the affections
are concerned primarily with action or feeling. This ought not
to be a problem, since the basic assumption of Watts's Doctrine
of the Passions is that the passions are instigators of action.
However, the favourite images of Watts and Doddridge suggest
release, dissolution, annihilation of a sense of self, passive
^ MuIIan, Sentiment and Sociability^ 16.
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enjoyment of a "frame": the emphasis as a result often appears
to rest on feeling rather than on action/'
The bond between writer and reader may occur because the respective
selves dissolve in similarity of vague passion and not because they
unite across their differences in a similar, more complex grasp of a
situation and what it calls for.
Adam Smith would put it more succinctly. Having noted that the
person of "most exquisite humanity" is "most capable of acquiring the
highest degree of self-command," he conceded that such a person
"may not, however, always have acquired it."'*^ From the perspective
of secular ethical thought, this is the core of the challenge Cowper
faced in his use of different voices. As a religionist, Cowper can
survive a challenge to his wholeness and authority by disclosing his
God-destined fragmentation. His rhetoric of grace easily bridges any
gaps he leaves open between his belief in divine commands and his
inability to live them. In the secular context, however, a failure to
integrate his sympathetic feelings with some plausible self-command
and prospect for action would critically injure the poem. Cowper
seems to want to balance pathetic self-disclosure and sympathetic
effusion with other voices so as to mitigate the charge that his
"exquisite humanity" has failed to fulfill itself in self-command. He
must guard against the suspicion that his "exquisite humanity" still
cohabits with vanity, hypocrisy, or even insanity—the latter being
absolute loss of "self-command." For example, he must keep this
question from being asked: if he has achieved the inner tranquility
that virtue and country living bring, why does he undergo the
arduous labor of long poems as an escape from "the anxieties of life"
(II, 302).'
In light of such questions and the incompatibility of Cowper's
main voices, it is tempting to call the poem a failure. This judgment
gives the satisfaction of evaluative closure but creates its own
problems. First, readers have admired the poem for two centuries,
although it is difficult to know whether they have liked the whole
poem or only parts of it. But given the poem's reputation, its success
Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, 193.
See Rivers, n42. I don't mean to suggest by naming Watt, Doddridge, and Smith in the
same passage that they mean the same thing, but to show that they, among others, recognize
clearly the problems Cowper encounters in founding much of his moral appeal on sympathy.
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ought to be treated as something of a historical fact. Second,
Cowper's poetics would make it desirable to leave such
determinations partly in the minds of individual readers. The
question then can become one of understanding and not evaluation.
Given the problems Cowper creates for himself, how does he achieve
what success he does, and what does that success tell us about the
history of poetic voice and authority?
The answer to the first question has been implied in my
discussion. Each kind of authority Cowper invokes has deficiencies,
and together they work against each other. The Biblical and
prophetic kind anchors authority in a higher source outside the
speaker and ultimately outside the discourse. This kind has the
advantage of being "authority" in the strong sense—a power and right
to prescribe opinion and behavior and to enforce them if necessary.
The other kind of authority we have examined is conferred by
individuals on those they trust. It cannot be coerced. Being gentler,
less hierarchical, and more naturally participatory, it precludes much
of the violence that can occur when people appropriate the divine
warrant. It acknowledges that ultimately every person decides for
herself or himself, though there are reasons for common consent.
However, because this kind comes from among equals, one can
always withdraw.
By combining several different voices and their corresponding
sources of authority and by tacitly undermining some of them as he
goes, Cowper seems to have pleased contemporary readers more in
The Task than in poems in which he maintained a relatively consistent
voice. His poem seems to have succeeded partly because it revealed
and navigated through the problems of poetic and moral authority
that existed both for himself and for poets generally in late-eighteenthcentury England. In a time when poets were repudiating the urbane
Augustan ethos but had not discovered a compelling voice to replace
it, when evangelical teaching mitigated the possibility of combining
doctrinal assuredness with the assertion of unassailable personal
worthiness to direct others, and when ethical theories were becoming
increasingly psychological, Cowper expressed the available avenues to
authority by circulating among them. His authority may be seen as
an avowed rhetorical construct to which he invites assent: readers
should grant it because he is sympathetic, honest, and humane. They
should grant it all the more because he is, by his own admission,
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prone to error and distrustful of human intellect and power. On the
other hand, he adopts a voice that effaces any mere human will or
effort, whether these pertain to his poetry or to readers' acceptance
or rejection of it, but which, rightly invoked, may participate in both.
That is the power of grace for which he may only supply the
occasion. In this reading, his awareness that he has little authority
may actually may work to increase his appeal as a moral and
intellectual guide.
Seen in the historical continuum, Cowper stands as the poet who
tried to sustain the poetic traditions of prophet and superior civic
censor while attempting to subordinate them to the new way of
sympathy. Milton had spoken as a prophet and wrote divine epic;
Pope spoke as a superior civic censor and wrote irony, satire, and
mock heroic. Cowper spoke as fellow sufferer but couldn't give up
entirely the prophetic m^e nor the ironic and satiric modes. He
didn't discover—at least in The
that the mock heroic frame
belongs to a different voice and authority than that which he settled
into as the poem unfolded. Nor did he see the degree to which
denunciation and invective lose their force when spoken by the
wounded recluse. Blake would see himself as prophet and would find
a language for his calling—succinct, declarative, visionary, and stark.
Wordsworth discovered in the sympathetic self the voice and
authority that Cowper had been fashioning, but to maintain these he
abandoned the claim to be a prophet in the older sense—though he
wished for another Milton—as well as the mock heroic. These
generalizations help us take Cowper on his own terms, as the
Christian poet who spoke in all these voices and in so doing defied
the fictionality of the integrated poetic ethos. His self-avowed failure
to achieve such an ethos is his most deeply felt claim to authority.

